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A national security strategy is supposed to describe the world as it is and explain how a country intends to navigate the constraints and opportunities in front of it. It is meant to be a map, not a message, and certainly not a mirror held up to a single political identity. The 2025 US national security strategy, released on December 4th, tries to present a unified view of American power but the foundation on which it rests is out of alignment with the physical, economic and geopolitical forces that will shape this century. A strategy built on a foundation of illusions becomes more fragile over time. The gap between the world described in this document and the world visible in the data is so wide that it is doomed to fail.
A good strategy begins with a diagnosis of reality. Richard Rumelt has argued for years that strategy is impossible without a sound understanding of the problem a leader is trying to solve. The current document offers a diagnosis that is framed through cultural and civilizational anxieties rather than observable global trends. Electrification, renewable generation, battery storage, demographic diversification, science driven migration flows, the institutional realignment of middle powers, and the emergence of new industrial supply chains are barely acknowledged. These are the forces reshaping global systems. A national security strategy is supposed to engage with these forces directly. Instead, it adopts a posture rooted in defensive cultural narratives that do not match the underlying physics or economics. This is the point where strategic drift begins.
The strategy attempts to anchor American strength in a vision of energy dominance based on oil, gas and nuclear energy. The world is moving in a different direction. Electric vehicles continue to climb in market share. Battery costs continue to fall on learning curves that have proven durable for two decades. Solar and wind generation are the cheapest sources of new electricity everywhere. Countries that rely on fossil imports are trying to replace them because volatility is expensive and electrified systems offer more control. Electricity as a commodity is becoming more central to every economic sector. High voltage transmission, long duration storage, flexible grids and clean industrial heat are the new strategic assets. Oil and gas exporters can still earn revenue during the transition but their leverage over other states diminishes as electrification spreads. Nuclear energy remains part of the mix but its export pathways are slow and capital heavy. A strategy that claims long term dominance through fossil exports is aiming at a shrinking target while the rest of the world invests in the next system.
The strategy’s focus on energy dominance overlooks the internal contradictions created by trying to satisfy both export driven revenue ambitions and the promise of cheap domestic energy for reshored industry. Higher exports pull U.S. oil and gas prices toward global market levels, which raises costs for industry and households at home. The shale sector adds another constraint. Producers have already exploited many of the highest profit sites, and new wells tend to decline faster and cost more to drill. This means the country is at the plateau of economically extractable oil and gas under current conditions. Maintaining high output becomes more expensive over time. Pursuing dominance through exports will therefore push domestic prices upward even as the underlying resource base becomes harder to develop. The alternative pathway, which relies on the continued expansion of renewables that already deliver low cost power in many regions, receives no attention in the strategy. Renewables appear only indirectly as something to be politically rejected under the label of “Net Zero ideology.” A transition to clean electricity would lower long term energy costs and strengthen economic competitiveness. The current policy direction moves in the opposite direction by tying American energy futures to a resource profile that is losing both cost advantage and structural relevance.
The strategy presents reshoring as a straightforward path to renewed industrial strength, but it does not acknowledge the conditions required for that shift to succeed. Large scale manufacturing investment depends on long term policy and regulatory stability because companies commit capital on multi decade timelines. The current environment, marked by abrupt tariff changes, political turnover and unpredictable administrative actions, increases risk for foreign investors who would otherwise finance new plants in the United States. I haven’t spoken to an investor this year who would commit long-term capital to the United States, leaving investments to speculation. Trump’s erratic policies have raised the price of debt and capital in the country, as money providers require greater returns due to the greater risks. Another overlooked constraint is the loss of industrial expertise after forty five years of offshoring. Many of the factories that left the country took with them skilled engineers, production specialists and operational knowledge that now reside in Asia and parts of Europe. Rebuilding advanced manufacturing capacity requires attracting those skills back into the country, which means welcoming foreign talent rather than restricting it. These conflicts were in sharp display at the battery factory where hundreds of South Korean nationals were arrested by ICE. These realities conflict directly with the strategy’s posture toward global investment and migration. A serious reshoring effort needs stable policy, predictable regulation and access to global expertise. None of these conditions are strengthened by the approach described in the document.
Soft power has always been one of the most durable elements of American influence. Culture, political values, stable institutions, scientific leadership and predictable diplomacy—elements of Joseph Nye’s widely accepted framework on soft power—created a reservoir of attraction that made alliances easier to maintain and agreements easier to negotiate. The current trajectory is rapidly eroding these sources. Tariffs on allies signal unpredictability. Cuts to aid programs signal retreat from global engagement and a key source of goodwill and contacts in recipient nations. Negative rhetoric aimed at partners makes cooperation more difficult. Visa tightening and suspicion of foreign researchers make the academic and scientific ecosystem less attractive. Public diplomacy institutions lose their reach when they are reduced in scope. Soft power takes time to build but it can erode faster than many expect when trust is damaged. The Trump Administration’s of the past year have caused significant and in some cases catastrophic decline in every aspect of US soft power. Instead, pandering to Trump is apparently seen as evidence of the existence of soft power, instead of placation of a dangerous and erratic world leader. A strategy that claims unparalleled soft power while acting in ways that radically undermine it is describing an asset that no longer exists in the same form.
Migration and demographic change receive heavy emphasis in the strategy. These themes appear as threats to national character and security. The data does not support this view. Immigrants in the United States, including undocumented immigrants, are less likely to commit crimes than native born citizens. They contribute to economic dynamism by adding skills and entrepreneurial capacity in regions that need both. Population growth driven by immigration has been an important part of American resilience. Demographic diversification supports innovation because different backgrounds and experiences create new problem solving approaches. Half of the US Fortune 500 were founded by immigrants or their children, and they certainly aren’t all white. Treating migration as a cultural threat rather than a policy challenge does not help the country align resources with real needs. Policies grounded in fear instead of evidence struggle to produce effective outcomes. A strategy that presents immigration as a driver of instability ignores the broad record of contribution that newcomers have made for generations.
The strategy misdiagnoses religious freedom and domestic sources of violence by framing Christianity as a besieged identity rather than recognising the real distribution of risk and harm in the United States. Federal threat assessments during the past decade have consistently identified rising violence against religious minorities, especially Jewish and Muslim communities, alongside extremist movements that draw heavily from Christian identity narratives. Domestic violence trends have been shaped by economic strain, gun access and online radicalisation rather than by any decline in the status of Christianity. By reversing these patterns and presenting the majority faith as the primary victim, the strategy directs attention away from the groups that are actually targeted. This framing is likely to produce policies that strengthen surveillance of minority communities and weaken surveillance of the actual sources of violence in the United States, something exemplified by the pardoning of the insurrectionists from January 6th, many of who are already back in jail for more violent offences after release. It will also encourage political rhetoric that deepens division inside the country rather than addressing the conditions that drive violence. A strategy that begins with a distorted diagnosis will struggle to produce coherent action because it focuses on threats that do not match the evidence.
Alliances are a strategic asset that depends on trust. The past few decades show that economic integration and shared democratic institutions create strong partnerships. The behaviour of a country toward its allies signals whether it can be counted on in difficult times. Aggressive tariff measures, public criticism of allied leaders, sudden shifts in diplomatic positions and inconsistent commitments weaken confidence. Countries respond by hedging. They develop deeper relationships with regional partners. They reduce reliance on American supply chains. They negotiate trade agreements without American involvement. Trust is not a soft concept. It is a material component of national security because it shapes the coalitions that determine global outcomes. A strategy that treats alliances as transactional loses sight of the long term value that stability creates.
There is a cost when culture war narratives are placed at the center of national security doctrine. Strategic clarity depends on a willingness to describe the world accurately. When racialized demographic fears or claims of civilizational decline are folded into official policy documents, the result is a distorted view of threats and opportunities. These narratives discourage cooperation with diverse domestic constituencies and with international partners who do not share the same identity framing. They focus attention on symbolic conflicts instead of structural challenges. They create friction in diplomacy because allies perceive the shift in tone immediately. National security analysis becomes less coherent when ideological boundaries define the set of acceptable conclusions.
A national security strategy grounded in the realities of the twenty first century would look different from the one offered in 2025. It would begin by acknowledging the global electrification trend and the rise of energy systems built around renewables, storage and flexible grids. It would frame climate as an operational risk that must be managed to maintain readiness. It would rebuild trust with allies by offering predictable commitments. It would anchor soft power by strengthening democratic institutions, open science and pluralism. It would treat migration as a policy domain where managed integration supports economic and social resilience. It would invest in clean industrial pathways for steel, cement, chemicals and logistics because these sectors will define competitiveness in the next decades. It would align American interests with the broad shifts already underway rather than resisting them.
The map in the current document does not match the terrain. The world is changing and the drivers of strategic advantage are changing with it. The United States has substantial assets that can support a renewed leadership role. For this to happen, the country needs a strategy that begins with an accurate diagnosis of the world as it stands and the world it is moving toward. This strategy then needs to stand for more than election cycle. The past decade has seen the US incapable of holding to and executing strategy past mid-terms, never mind presidential election cycles. The US 2025 national security strategy is the document of an empire in decline, thrashing as it fades.
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