Saskatoon Transit at Crossroads: Grid Emissions vs. Electric Buses

Last Updated on: 29th May 2025, 10:37 pm

Saskatoon recently faced a critical decision regarding its transit strategy, specifically around the adoption of zero-emission buses (ZEBs). This decision arose from an evaluation conducted by the Canadian Urban Transit Research and Innovation Consortium (CUTRIC), aimed at guiding Saskatoon Transit’s 10-year fleet renewal strategy. The evaluation highlighted a challenging dilemma: whether Saskatchewan’s current grid emissions intensity genuinely supports a rapid transition to battery-electric buses (BEBs).

In a welcome step toward greater transparency and impartiality, CUTRIC has recently adjusted its board composition by removing members representing Enbridge and Ballard Power Systems. Previously, these companies were in deep conflict due to their clear interests in promoting hydrogen and natural gas technologies, raising significant concerns about the impartiality of CUTRIC’s prior research and guidance to transit agencies, with their work with Brampton and Mississauga being major cases of concern. The removal of these members signals a positive shift in addressing glaring conflicts of interest, especially in the context of transit electrification strategies.

It’s not perfect. Natural gas and hence hydrogen-focused utilities such as FortisBC, FortisAB, Atura, and Enbridge remain dues paying members of CUTRIC at the high utility memberships for no reason that is apparently obvious except the promotion of hydrogen and CNG buses, neither of which are actual transit solutions going forward. Similarly, perpetual money-loser Ballard is in the highest paying industry membership category, and it only makes money if hydrogen buses are pushed. The high dues for industry and utilities provide relief for academic, transit, and non-governmental organizations, but purse strings are strings. More could be done in governance to firewall CUTRIC from undue influence. It’s possible that more is being done internally by the board and executive that isn’t visible, but what is invisible doesn’t provide any comfort in this regard.

CUTRIC’s earlier report for Brampton was deeply flawed, skewing the costs by $1.5 billion in favor of a blended hydrogen and battery electric fleet, in a manner which made it clear that the methodology used was intended to maximize hydrogen buses. In that study, Deloitte was complicit, likely having done the majority of the work given that CUTRIC was not resourced adequately with sufficient senior staff to perform significant scenario modeling.

• $1.1 billion for modeling that pushed hydrogen bus acquisition out so far in time that discounting due to inflation reduced their costs by 40%
• $200 million extra for gray hydrogen costs that are in line with real world actuals for trucked in hydrogen
• $100 million less for replacement of batteries in battery-electric buses as batteries in real world fleets are lasting much longer than projected and costs in the 2030s will drop significantly
• $25 million extra in costs for hydrogen fuel cell replacements as they are lasting only 3 years in real world fleets
• $25 million extra for carbon pricing for gray hydrogen which was entirely excluded from the cost case by CUTRIC
• $10 million extra for hydrogen storage and refueling facilities as CUTRIC had low-balled that cost based on global data, ignoring the costs of the hydrogen liquification components they had included.

There’s no indication that Deloitte or another consultancy was engaged in the Saskatoon report, although that was discovered through other city documents in the case of Brampton, and Deloitte’s name was nowhere on the report itself.

CUTRIC’s most recent report for Saskatoon demonstrates marked improvements in results. Although, their methodology and assumptions are opaque, not included in the report or any inclusions in documents provided to city council. Analysis shows that flaws remain. The report decisively identifies battery-electric buses as significantly more cost-effective than either hydrogen fuel-cell electric buses (FCEBs) or blended solutions. Unlike the Brampton study, which had minimized or entirely omitted crucial hydrogen infrastructure, fuel, and climate costs, the Saskatoon report now provides at least a better result.

The TCO of a battery electric only scneario was only 44% of the TCO of fuel cell only, and 20% cheaper than a blended fleet. However, there’s more for CUTRIC to do. The TCO of the hydrogen fuel cell only fleet was $1.1 billion spread over 298 buses. The blended fleet had 203 hydrogen buses as well as 98 hydrogen buses, yet somehow the 203 hydrogen buses didn’t drive $750 million into the TCO. Just as with Brampton, there’s clearly some bad scenario modeling involved in depreciating hydrogen buses in a blended fleet.

Indeed, CUTRIC performed the same discounting magic for Saskatoon that it did for Brampton, pushing the majority of expensive fuel cell buses out so far that the 3.5% discounting rate eliminated a large percentage of the costs. Meanwhile, they front end loaded the battery electric buses in the mixed fleet scenario and bought no new battery electric buses in later years. This despite ongoing massive decreases in battery prices and hence capital costs for buses, and ongoing increases in battery energy density, including at the pack level. CUTRIC still has a very fat thumb on the scale for hydrogen, but it was inadequate to make it fiscally viable for Saskatoon, unlike Brampton.

An ongoing challenge CUTRIC has is the basics of quality assurance. This diagram from page 25 of the report has numbers of buses much higher than the number of buses in the conclusions section on pages 35 and 36, with no explanation for the discrepancy. While that might be appropriate for fuel cell buses, which have been shown to have shorter lifespans than battery electric or diesel buses, it’s not like low-maintenance battery electric buses will require replacement before their fifteen-year lifespan is over. Global data on battery packs make it clear that they’ll outlast the vehicle.

Further, CUTRIC continues to treat maintenance costs for battery electric buses and hydrogen fuel cell buses as if they are equal, putting a single number of $0.94/km/bus for the two classes of vehicle, double that of diesel. The 12-year costs of operations and maintenance for fuel cell buses are $2.8 million compared to about $1 million for battery electric buses, about three times more, which is accurate solely for fuel costs. However, California and European data make it clear that maintenance costs alone are much higher as well, about double those for battery electric.

Further, Californian and European data make it clear electric bus maintenance is at par and usually below maintenance costs for diesel buses. Parking maintenance costs at double that of diesel is yet again a thumb on the scale against battery electric, which might explain Saskatoon’s eventual decision.

This chart is presumed to be the average cost per vehicle — for an unclear number of vehicles as noted above — for the fleets, hence the reason why the capital costs for battery electric buses appear to be much higher than the capital cost of purchases listed elsewhere. However, they still don’t make any sense, as hydrogen buses by themselves are $1.8 million, approximately what is shown on this chart. CUTRIC consistently under-costs hydrogen refueling infrastructure and has questionable costs for electric refueling infrastructure.

It’s possible that CUTRIC has corrected some of its underpinning assumptions around this since the harsh criticism and others aimed at the Brampton report, but once again they aren’t available because CUTRIC doesn’t publish them for assessment. This isn’t a peer-reviewed model, it’s a bespoke model built in house, and clearly flawed. That said, all models are broken, while some are useful. This time it wasn’t bent so badly out of shape that a blatantly wrong conclusion was reached.

Despite the better outcomes (if dubious modeling and assumptions), the practical realities of Saskatchewan’s electricity grid emissions intensity remain a challenge. Currently, the grid’s emissions intensity sits around 730 grams of CO₂e per kilowatt-hour, limiting immediate emissions reduction benefits from BEBs. CUTRIC’s analysis accurately reflects that, under present conditions, BEBs in Saskatoon achieve emissions reductions of only about 10 to 15 percent compared to diesel buses.

However, this modest immediate benefit overlooks the long-term potential for dramatically improved outcomes as Saskatchewan aggressively pursues its stated grid decarbonization targets—aiming for a 50 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 and complete net-zero by 2050. It appears that CUTRIC’s modeling assumed zero reduction in CO2e/kWh, a clearly flawed assumption. This isn’t just my observation. A submission to council from a Saskatoon citizen pointed it out:

“The main question that I would like to raise about the Cutric report is: what did they assume Saskatoon/Saskatchewan’s energy grid composition would look like over the 15 years of their model? Because I see mention in the report that battery electric buses (BEBs) are less effective at preventing GHG emissions here because of our current reliance on coal and gas. But I do not see any explanation of how they assumed our power generation would change over time.”

Other submissions point out that electric buses not only address climate change, but that they provide significant additional benefits for community health, and will only improve in emissions per kilometer over time.

One crucial aspect the report missed again is the potential to reduce BEB operational emissions further through innovative heating technologies suitable for Canada’s cold climates. Heat pump technology, improved insulation solutions, and radiative electric heating systems are being used globally as effective alternatives to traditional diesel heaters, in conditions as harsh as or harsher than Canada’s. These solutions significantly reduce emissions while providing efficient heating for electric buses, even in severe winter conditions. At present, New Flyer doesn’t bother with bus insulation because there is so much waste heat from diesel engines and fuel cells. While that might be inexpensive heat from diesel engines, the waste heat from fuel cells is expensive heat, as it comes from expensive hydrogen, at costs of $25/kg per the report. (As a note, that’s a much more appropriate figure than the ones used for Brampton or Mississauga, where hydrogen costs were lowballed by a lot.) BYB provides heat pumps and insulation as an option for its buses, and Canadian cities should be demanding the same from New Flyer.

There are two further points about buses and range. Fuel cell vehicles see similar percentage range reductions in the winter, a bit above diesel reductions, but start from a higher base range today, so it’s less impactful. However, with increasing battery energy density and declining costs, it’s reasonable to assume electric buses with double the range for the same price will be available in the early 2030s, making them equivalent even with electric heat.

Given the current modest emissions reduction from BEBs, Saskatoon opted to request exemptions from federal zero-emission mandates, planning instead to continue investing in diesel buses. This decision carries a significant risk of locking the city into higher emissions and prolonged fossil fuel dependency. Moreover, it appears to diverge from Saskatchewan’s broader climate commitments, potentially undermining the province’s stated goals of substantial emissions reductions. By choosing diesel investments now, Saskatoon risks missing a timely and financially prudent shift to cleaner technologies that would align better with future grid improvements.

CUTRIC’s recent steps to address earlier concerns about conflicts of interest, and better if still flawed results for Saskatoon, offer cautious optimism about the consortium’s future direction. However, continued vigilance and transparent reporting practices will be essential to maintain and build further trust. CUTRIC’s ongoing evolution toward more accurate and unbiased analysis is critical, not only for Saskatoon but also for other Canadian cities seeking effective pathways toward transit electrification. Either that, or collapsing CUTRIC and forming an actually unbiased, data-centric organization.

Did Saskatoon make the right call to buy a bunch more diesel buses, the recommendation to council? No, they should have expanded their electric bus fleet and continued on the transition. Should the Investing in Canada Infrastructure Program (ICIP) fund more diesel buses, as Saskatoon is going to ask them to do? Perhaps some, but it should be forcing more battery electrification into fleets.

Would Saskatoon have made the same decision if CUTRIC’s modeling was better? It’s difficult to say. CUTRIC is correct that battery electric bus capital costs and Saskatchewan’s grid emissions are higher today. But neither of those is defensible as a basis for modeling. A more realistic cost model for battery electric buses and a couple of options for aggressiveness for the transition would be much more useful in terms of actual decision making. Continuing to include fuel cell buses as if they were a reasonable option isn’t doing Canadian cities any favors.