Trump’s Big, Beautiful Bill Accelerates Hydrogen Economy’s Inevitable Fall

For years, I’ve been openly dismissive of the hydrogen for energy economy—particularly the financial prospects of its most hyped members, Plug Power, FuelCell Energy, and Ballard Power. The hydrogen-for-energy vision was never built on firm economic foundations. It relied heavily on the ongoing generosity of governments to subsidize fundamentally and increasingly uncompetitive technologies.

The latest political developments in the United States, specifically the rapid advancement of the so-called “Big, Beautiful Bill” (BBB), have now dramatically accelerated what was always an inevitable reckoning for these companies. The Biden-era incentives that temporarily propped up their prospects are set to be dismantled by a Republican-controlled Congress obediently following former President Trump’s directives, enforced by threats of primary challenges to any dissenters. And with French and German economists calling foul on hydrogen for road transportation, it’s not like Europe is going to be a savior.

Plug Power, in particular, finds itself perilously close to disaster. Its stock price, languishing stubbornly below the crucial Nasdaq $1 minimum bid requirement for 30 days, has triggered a countdown to almost certain delisting. Despite repeated efforts to stabilize its price through equity issuance and high-profile financing arrangements, Plug Power continues to burn through staggering amounts of cash, hemorrhaging more than $150 million per quarter. The company’s negative gross margins—persistently running at over 50%—highlight just how deeply flawed its business model has become.

The promised transition to profitability always seemed elusive, and recent setbacks, including the threat of elimination of a $1.66 billion DOE loan guarantee, have made that hope even more remote. Plug Power’s reliance on Section 45V hydrogen tax credits underpins its entire hydrogen production strategy, yet with these credits facing elimination under the BBB, Plug Power’s economic rationale collapses instantly. Even the company’s CFO’s recent stock purchases, intended as a symbolic vote of confidence, have failed to shift market sentiment. Delisting in the second half of 2025 now seems unavoidable, as does the possibility of restructuring or bankruptcy soon thereafter.

FuelCell Energy’s situation, if anything, is even more precarious. The company has struggled for years, relying repeatedly on dilutive equity offerings and multiple reverse stock splits just to maintain compliance with Nasdaq’s listing requirements. Its most recent 1-for-30 reverse split, executed in late 2024, raised the stock price temporarily, but underlying market skepticism remains evident. This is after a 1-for-12 reverse split in 2019, meaning it’s at 1-for-360 now. This isn’t remotely a growth stock.

FuelCell’s core market of stationary power generation using fuel cells always rested on fragile economics, relying heavily on sustained subsidies, low-cost financing, and favorable regulatory environments. The loss of the 45V hydrogen tax credit and deep cuts to federal grants and loan programs promised by the BBB threaten to wipe away any lingering financial rationale for new or ongoing projects. Without substantial government incentives, utilities and corporate customers will inevitably revert to more cost-effective alternatives like solar, wind, and battery storage, leaving FuelCell with declining revenues and an unmanageable cost structure. Investors should brace for another period of sharp declines, delisting, and continued dilution of shareholder value, which seems virtually assured in 2025. It’s not like the SEC will consider another reverse stock split as a reason to keep it listed.

Ballard Power, meanwhile, presents a somewhat different picture, though equally problematic. The Canadian company, one that bizarrely pivoted away from lithium ion batteries around 1990, has long championed fuel cells for heavy-duty transportation—trucks, buses, trains, and marine vessels—arguing that hydrogen was the ideal solution for applications supposedly beyond the range of battery-electric alternatives. This claim, however, has steadily eroded over the years as battery technology rapidly improved, energy densities increased, and costs continued to plummet.

Ballard’s narrative that hydrogen-powered vehicles offered superior practicality or economics has progressively unraveled under market realities. Its modest North American revenue, heavily dependent on government-supported trials and projects, has never approached profitability. Now, with U.S. subsidies at serious risk of elimination, Ballard’s ability to meaningfully grow sales, especially in the United States, faces collapse. Moreover, the company’s substantial cash reserve—accumulated during the brief hydrogen boom of the early 2020s—may cushion short-term financial impacts, but it does nothing to resolve the fundamental flaw in its underlying market premise. Ballard is effectively trapped in a business model continually undermined by relentless improvements in battery-electric technology and infrastructure. There is a reason it’s never made a profit, losing an average of $55 million a year since 2000. Mind you, in this race to the bottom, Plug Power and FuelCell Energy have lost more than Ballard.

Ballard also faces an additional dimension of geopolitical risk tied directly to its significant relationship with China. Weichai Power, a major Chinese transportation conglomerate, holds approximately 15% of Ballard’s shares, a strategic partnership initially viewed as advantageous for accessing the Chinese market. However, the shifting political landscape in the United States—especially with the BBB’s proposed Foreign Entity of Concern provisions—creates a tangible regulatory risk. Under these new provisions, Ballard’s relationship with Weichai could be scrutinized or restricted, further complicating its already tenuous access to U.S. subsidies, contracts, or potentially even operations. The escalating geopolitical tension between the U.S. and China is not something Ballard can simply dismiss or easily manage away. It adds a layer of uncertainty and complexity at a moment when the company can least afford it.

The wider implications of delisting for Plug Power and FuelCell Energy are severe. Delisting typically triggers a catastrophic loss of investor confidence, institutional abandonment, and severe constraints on accessing capital markets. Once relegated to over-the-counter markets, liquidity evaporates, equity raises become even more dilutive, and existing shareholders often face wipeouts. Even Ballard, despite its temporary cash buffer, would inevitably face knock-on effects from such events. Investors would rightly question the viability of hydrogen-focused businesses, withdrawing funds sector-wide. Companies dependent on infrastructure rollouts—like hydrogen refueling stations or production hubs—would see projects stall or collapse, amplifying industry-wide distress.

This situation, however grim, was always predictable and, indeed, predicted. The structural inefficiencies of hydrogen as an energy carrier—particularly its energy-intensive production, expensive distribution infrastructure, and poor end-to-end energy efficiency compared to direct electrification—have long been apparent. Battery-electric technology, driven by exponentially improving economics and relentless performance enhancements, consistently outcompetes hydrogen in virtually every measurable metric for transportation, storage, and grid applications. The hydrogen economy was always dependent on continuous, substantial subsidies and aggressive government backing to remain even marginally competitive. The BBB legislation is merely accelerating what market forces would have eventually imposed naturally.

Given these circumstances, the recommendation for investors must be straightforward: outright avoidance or pure volatility plays. Plug Power and FuelCell Energy, facing imminent delisting and existential financial threats, represent exceptionally risky propositions with minimal paths to recovery or long-term viability. Ballard, although financially stable for now, operates on deeply flawed market assumptions. It will continue burning through tens of millions of dollars annually, with no realistic path toward profitability as battery-electric solutions accelerate their dominance in transportation.

The hydrogen bubble has burst, revealing once-promising ventures as financially unsustainable enterprises, propped up by political enthusiasm rather than robust market fundamentals. The BBB legislation, backed by an aggressively whipped Republican Congress, simply hastens the demise of a technology sector whose economic flaws were always glaringly evident.